New Jersey Lawyer & Attorney : Stark & Stark Law Firm : New Jersey Law Blog

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In the case of Michael S. Kimm v. Blisset, LLC., et als., in an opinion decided on August 28, 2006, the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey ( Docket No. A-0965-04T2)  dealt with issues concerning the scope of an arbitrator's powers.    In the opinion, the Court drew distinctions between:  1) fee disputes between attorneys and clients; 2) arbitrations in Court annexed proceedings; and 3) arbitrations held pursuant to private agreements.  In addition, the Court focused on the meaning of the recently enacted  New Jersey Arbitration Act, N.J.S.A. 2 A: 23 B-1 to 32 as it relates to the powers of an arbitrator.   

The Court noted that, at its heart, arbitration is a creature of contract.  It is a favored remedy and arbitration agreements are liberally recognized.   It is state contract law principles that generally govern whether a valid agreement to arbitrate exists.

An arbitrator's powers is generally limited by the agreement of the parties.  The Court therefore noted that where only one of the parties believes that the arbitrator was empowered to act, and there was no evidence of an actual agreement, the arbitrator has no authority to act at all.    If the parties have not agreed in advance, the parties cannot force an arbitrator to give reasons for the award or to write a decision  explaining  his or her view of the facts.

In New Jersey, agreements to arbitrate made on or after January 1, 2003, are governed by the revised New Jersey Arbitration Act.  N.J.S.A.  2 A: 23B - 3a.  This revised Act is based largely on the Uniform Arbitration Act of 2000, see Assembly Judiciary Committee Statement on Senate Bill No. 514, L. 2003 c.95, and codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -32.  This statute replaces the earlier version of the Arbitration Act, see N.J.S.A. 2A: 24 - 1 to -11.

The earlier statute required a written contract or a written "agreement to submit" to arbitration, in order for a party to be required to proceed to arbitration.    The revised statute, by comparison, only requires a "record", which presumably might fall short of a formal, contractual writing.  In addition, under the prior statute, an arbitrator's award had to be reduced to a judgment by a Court in order to be enforceable and the Court would have the ability to vacate, modify or correct the arbitrator's award .  

Under the new statute, the grounds upon which a Court may vacate an award have been expanded and the new statute also empowers the Court to correct or modify an award. The earlier statute gave the Court the authority to vacate an arbitrator's award if the arbitrator "so imperfectly executed (his) powers that a mutual, final and definite award" was not made.  The revised act specifically excludes an attack on an award, either by way of application to the arbitrator or the Court, on the grounds of imperfection, if the claim of imperfection is addressed to the merits of the award.  While an arbitrator may "clarify" the award, the arbitrator may not change his or her mind or reconsider the decision, in the guise of clarification.

Parties intending to have their disputes completely  resolved by arbitration should take care that any agreements they enter into deal clearly and concisely with the issue of what is to be arbitrated and how the arbitration is to be handled and be aware of the provisions of the New Jersey Arbitration Act.

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On April 12, 2006, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility issued Formal Opinion 06-439 on a lawyer's obligation of truthfulness when representing a client in negotiations in caucused mediation.

Under Model Rule 4.1, a lawyer representing a client in general negotiations outside of the mediation process may not make a false statement of material fact to a third person. However, statements that are considered to be negotiation "puffing", or statements regarding a party's negotiating goals are not considered as false statements of material facts within the meaning of the Model Rules when dealing with general negotiations. The simple example given is where an attorney understates the willingness of a client to make concessions to resolve a dispute. Another example is where a party may exaggerate or emphasize the strengths or minimize the weakness of a factual or legal position. These remarks have been viewed as statements as to which a party would not ordinarily be expected to justifiably rely and are distinguished from a false statement of material fact.

There are obviously two different sides to the issue. In the context of a mediation, it has been argued that lawyers should be held to a more exacting standard of truthfulness because a neutral is involved. The other side asserts that less attention need be paid to the accuracy of information being communicated in a mediation as consensual deception is intrinsic to the process. The issue of "truthfulness in negotiations" also raises the question of whether a lawyer can accept a result that is unconscionably unfair, when it is to the benefit of the lawyer's own client. The other side takes the position that deception is inherent in the negotiation process and that an advocate should take advantage of every opportunity to advance the cause of the client.

In the Opinion, the Committee found that the ethical standard for negotiating in or out of the mediation process are the same. Lawyers are not held to a different or higher standard in a mediation because of the consensual nature of mediation. The Model Rules do not require a higher standard of truthfulness in any particular negotiating context. The Committee ruled that a lawyer representing a party may not make a false statement of material fact to a third person but may make statements regarding negotiating goals or willingness to compromise. For example, even though a client's Board of Directors has authorized a higher settlement figure, a lawyer may state in a negotiation that the client does not wish to settle for more than $50. However, it would not be permissible for the lawyer to state that the Board of Directors had formally disapproved any settlement in excess of $50., when authority had been in fact been granted to settle for a higher figure.

Technorati Tags: New Jersey : Alternative Dispute Resolution : Mediation

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In 1982, in the case of Cenco Inc, v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449 (7th Cir. 1982), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the "imputation doctrine" should prohibit all shareholder lawsuits against auditors who were allegedly negligent in performing their auditing duties for a corporate client, where fraud resulted in losses to the shareholders. This case was decided under Illinois law and sought to protect outside auditors against fraud committed by the client, even though a more thorough examination may have disclosed the fraud or at least certain improprieties. This same issue of auditor liability was last addressed in New Jersey in 1990 in the Appellate Division case of In re Integrity Trust, 240 N.J. Super. 480 (App. Div. 1990) where the Court ruled that an outside auditor could be held liable in a fraud case where the auditor actually helped in the fraud.

The New Jersey Supreme Court was recently faced with a similar issue in the case of NCP Litigation Trust v. KPMG, LLC., A-19 September Term 2004, decided June 28, 2006. In the NCP case, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that auditor responsibility was not limited to only auditors who actively participated in the corporate fraud. The Court found that independent auditors can be held liable for a corporate client's fraud, even if they did not participate in or have direct knowledge of the misconduct. The New Jersey Supreme Court expressly declined to follow the Illinois decision in Cenco Inc. stating that Cenco was decided more than 20 years before and that "events since then suggest that auditors must be more alert to corporate fraud and, where appropriate, courts should take steps to protect and safeguard the public from that fraud". The New Jersey Supreme Court indicated that it was writing "...under a clean slate in addressing the issue under New Jersey law. "

The NCP case involved a fraud committed by the chief financial officer and chief executive officer who provided the auditor with fake numbers to artificially inflate the company's stock value and thereby bolster the CFO's financial stake in the business. The company eventually filed bankruptcy and it's shareholders sued the auditor for malpractice claiming that the auditors knew or should have known of the CFO-CEO's fraudulent activities.

The auditor defended the suit on the basis of the "imputation doctrine", which generally protects third parties from suits involving corporate wrongdoers. The Court held that the auditor may have had an independent contractual obligation to detect the fraud, which it allegedly failed to do. The "imputation doctrine" was designed to protect the innocent and the Court found that relieving the auditor of liability would not promote the purpose of the doctrine.

Justices Jaynee laVecchia and Roberto-Soto wrote dissenting opinions stating that the "imputation doctrine" should apply, especially because the auditors in this case were not aware of and did not participate in the creation of fraudulent financial data.

Technorati Tags: New Jersey : Imputation Doctrine : Corporate Fraud

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In a recent decision in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen County (In the Matter of the Estate of Louis Spadaccini, Deceased), the Honorable Peter E. Doyne, reviewed the current case law dealing with "lack of testamentary capacity " and "undue influence" in probate litigation and will contests.

On the issue of whether an individual has the "testamentary capacity" to execute a will, Judge Doyne noted that the mental capacity of a testator is to be tested as of the time of the execution of the will. Gellert v. Livingston, 5 N.J. 65 (1950). The test of whether an individual has the necessary testamentary capacity to execute a will centers around whether the testator was able to comprehend and understand: the property he was about to dispose; the natural objects of his bounty; the meaning of the business in which he is engaged; the relation of each of these factors to the other and the manner of distribution that is set forth in the will. See, In re Will of Landsman, N.J. Super. 252, 267 (App.Div. 1999).

In addition to what the party claiming a lack of testamentary capacity must prove, the contestant usually has the burden of proving that there was a lack of capacity by clear and convincing evidence, In re Coffin's Estate, 103 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1968), as it is presumed that the testator was of sound mind and competent when a will is executed. Haynes v. First National State Bank, 87 N.J. 163, 175-176 (1981).

On the issue of "undue influence", Judge Doyne, citing the Haynes case, noted that undue influence is the "mental, moral or physical" exertion which destroys the "free agency of the testator" by preventing him "from following the dictates of his own mind and will and accepting instead the domination and influence of another." As in the case of testamentary capacity, the burden of proving undue influence falls upon the party claiming that there was undue influence.

However, of particular significance is the fact that the burden of proof will switch if it can be shown that a confidential relationship existed between the testator and beneficiary and suspicious circumstances are present.

These basic concepts and points of law are relevant to almost every will contest. Unfortunately, probate litigation usually involves fights among family members where the relationship has deteriorated over the years. When a loved one dies, some family members will have remained close with the decedent, and the relationship with others will have faded. Whatever the relationship, questions as to the disposition of a loved one's assets often present issues of capacity and undue influence.

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When first entering into the mediation process, it is not unusual for one or both sides to not have much faith that mediation will be able to solve the dispute. However, experience has shown that a skilled, trained, mediator, with knowledge of the industry, can help to bring an amicable solution to even the most adverse situation.

As reported in The Washington Business Review, the Marty and Dorothy Silverman Foundation ("Foundation") is seeking payment of nearly $25 million for 31 acres of property from the University Heights Association ("UHA") in Albany, N.Y. The UHA is a consortium of the Albany Medical Center, Albany Law School, Albany College of Pharmacy and The Sage College's Albany campus, and is looking to improve the inventory of buildings on the four campuses as well as create a medical research hub and improve the surrounding neighborhood. The UHA contends that the $25 million in dispute were not loans that needed to be repaid and that the Foundation intended to forgive the payments. Foundation lawyers indicate that the UHA filed tax returns and financial statements in which it listed the payments as loans and that the loans are to be repaid.

The parties have been trying to come to a meeting of the minds that is acceptable to everybody, without success, for over three years.

After the filing of two lawsuits by the Foundation, the UHA attempted to seek Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection in a defensive move to protect association assets, but a Federal Bankruptcy Court Judge dismissed the filing as premature. State Supreme Court Justice Karla Moskowitz has ordered the two sides to try to work out their differences through the Alternative Dispute Resolution program in Manhattan.

While the parties are somewhat skeptical that mediation can help settle this longstanding dispute, both sides will give it a good faith try. The UHA indicated that the Chapter 11 could be refiled, depending on the outcome of mediation.

The Court will pick a mediator who is acceptable to both sides. The mediation process, which is anticipated to take between thirty and forty-five days, is non-binding.

It will be interesting to see if the mediation process can help these parties resolve their differences and avoid a costly fight played out in the courts.

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If a will has been admitted to probate by the Surrogate's Court, New Jersey Court Rule 4:85-1 allows a party four months to file a complaint to set it aside. However, if the complaint is not filed within the four month period, a party may seek relief under the "escape provision" of Rule 4:85-1 and file the complaint within a "reasonable time under the circumstances". Under section (f) of New Jersey Court Rule 4:50, this relief can only be secured where there are exceptional, extraordinary and compelling grounds for such relief.

In The Matter of the Estate of Florence Schifftner, Deceased, decided on April 25, 2006, the Appellate Division of the New Jersey Superior Court dealt with the issue of whether an inability to afford counsel constitutes "exceptional, extraordinary and compelling grounds" and therefore a reason to allow a litigant to attack the probate of a will after the four month period.

The plaintiff in the Schifftner case was seeking to overturn a judgment admitting the will of his late mother to probate. The will had been probated after due notice to the plaintiff and he did not file an appeal. The plaintiff argued that although he was aware of the will being probated, he was unable to take appropriate action as his did not have sufficient funds at the time to hire an attorney. The Appellate Division concluded that indigence, under the circumstances of this case, was not an "extraordinary" reason justifying relief. The Court noted that it was an unfortunate fact that many litigants were unwilling to obtain, or unable to afford, representation. The Court went on to say that pro se litigants are allowed the same protection afforded to represented litigants and pro se litigants are given the right to be heard. The Court held that counsel is only required when a litigant faces a "consequence of magnitude" such as a criminal prosecution that threatens actual incarceration or the loss of a fundamental constitutional right such as an interference with the parental relationship.

The Court went on to say that where the consequences are less severe, the failure of representation is not fatal. The possibility of losing a civil suit does not implicate the need to have counsel. The plaintiff in Schifftner, having filed his complaint to overturn probate of a will more than four months after probate, was therefore not allowed to use the Rule 4:50 "escape provision" based upon the fact that he could not afford to hire a lawyer during the applicable time period.

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With a recently retired Federal Judge playing the role of a mediator, a dispute between power giant American National Power ("ANP") and the Town of Blackstone ("Blackstone") in Massachusetts is taking a break from the Courthouse. The pending litigation concerns an estimated $10 million in tax revenue that Blackstone officials maintain the company must pay the town through 2019 concerning one of the company's co-generation plants. The mediation is an attempt to resolve two legal actions the company has filed in protest of its bills, which actions are pending before the Massachusetts Appellate Tax Board in Boston and the Middlesex County Superior Court in Framingham, MA.

The combatants met for two lengthy sessions of mediation and among those participating were Blackstone Town Administrator Raymond Houle, Selectman Chairman Charles Sawyer and other members of the selectmen's panel.

A mediated settlement will be of obvious benefit to all involved since it will allow the town and the company to avoid a costly litigation battle. During last October's financial town meeting, Blackstone voters, acting on the request of officials, appropriated $50,000 as a down payment on the legal costs of taking a stand against ANP in court. This year, officials are asking for an even heftier fortification of the war chest -- $250,000 -- to carry on the courtroom battle, if necessary.

Arguing that softening market conditions for electricity have lessened the value of its holdings, ANP wants the town to reduce its assessments, thereby lowering the company's tax bills. The town calculates ANP's taxes in two ways: Like any property owner, ANP gets a tax bills for its real estate and land. When the company built its plant in the late 1990s, it also negotiated a plan known as a Payment in Lieu of Taxes, or PILOT, fixing assessments on turbines and other business equipment for 20 years, through 2019.

The two methods resulted in a combined assessment of roughly $2.87 million on the company this year. But the company, as it did last year, protested the assessment in court and paid only a portion of it -- about $1.94 million. The payment represents 100 percent of the company's obligations on real estate, but only about two-thirds of what the town maintains it owes under the PILOT. If the trend continued for the life of the agreement, the town would stand to lose about $10 million in revenue.

This is another example of the beneficial role mediated resolutions can play in business litigation.

Technorati Tags: New Jersey : ADR : Alternative Dispute Resolution

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The New Jersey Court Rules do not specifically define whether a professional who is subpoenaed to testify at a deposition is entitled to be compensated for the time spent at the deposition. In the matter of Leonard Charles v. 1170 Apartment Corp. et. als., the New Jersey Apellate Division recently dealt with this issue. This case involved an attorney who was subpoenaed to testify at a deposition involving a former client. The attorney was no longer involved in the case and had no interest in the outcome. The attorney requested that he be compensated at his usual hourly rate and the plaintiff that subpoenaed him refused to pay him.

New Jersey Court Rule 4:14-7(b)(1) provides that a subpoened witness shall be reimbursed for the "out-of-pocket" expenses and loss of pay incurred in attending the deposition. The plaintiff in the Charles case argued that the subpoenaed attorney should not be compensated as the Rule was only intended to protect individuals such as hourly employees. The plaintiff asserted that the Rule was not intended to cover professionals. The Appellate Division disagreed and held that a literal reading of the Rule would defeat the underlying intent. The Court noted that the overwhelming purpose of the Rule was to provide compensation to individuals who are compelled to appear at a deposition in a controversy in which they have no stake in the outcome. The Court went on to hold that the term "loss of pay" includes an actual loss of income, as in the case of a salaried employee, or in the case of a professional, loss of billable time. It does not matter whether the professional is a member of a firm or is a single practitioner.

The Court concluded by quoting President Lincoln and noting that "a lawyer's time and advice are his (or her) stock in trade." This opinion is extremely helpful to all involved as it resolves as issue that has caused uncertainty where none should exist.

Technorati Tags: New Jersey : Litigation

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