Stark & Stark Shareholder To Present Seminars at 64th Annual Atlantic Builders Convention

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Gary S. Forshner, Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Real Estate, Zoning & Land Use Group will present several seminars at the New Jersey Builders Association’s the 64th Annual Atlantic Builders Convention:

  1. Ethics in Land Use Law - Wednesday March 28, 2012 from 9:00 - 10:30 AM
  2. New Developments in Affordable Housing – Wednesday March 28, 2012 from 11:00 AM - 12:30PM
  3. New Requirements in Condominium Financing - Thursday March 29, 2012 from 11:00 AM -12:30 PM

The seminars will take place during the 3-day convention which will be held Wednesday March 28, 2012 through Friday March 30, 2012 in Atlantic City New Jersey. Additional information on other seminars which will be held during the convention can be found online here.

The Changing Face of Domestic Violence

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Since passage of the New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act over two decades ago, family courts have become inundated with domestic violence cases of all shades and stripes. Since the Act established the lowest legal burden of proof (a “preponderance of the evidence” as opposed to “clear and convincing” or ”beyond a reasonable doubt”),  Final Restraining Orders became relatively easy to obtain. There were, of course, reversals of some decisions but many attorneys, myself included, agreed that defendants in  domestic violence cases stood at least as much chance of losing than prevailing at trial. 

 

In recent months, legal observers have witnessed a trend by trial and appellate judges to exercise greater caution in this sensitive area of the law. In part, this recognizes the inherent distinction between domestic discord and domestic violence, the latter of which carries significant legal penalties if proven to exist. The intent of the Domestic Violence Act was to protect bona fide victims of domestic violence, not to create a remedy for all offensive conduct. Thus, even if a predicate act of domestic violence is found to exist, courts are not compelled to enter a Final Restraining Order unless there is a continuing need to protect the health and safety of the victim.

 

The recent trend of more critically examining the elements and public policy aspects of the Domestic Violence Act should result in more consistent decisions, a level playing field and protection of true domestic violence victims.

 

John Eory is the Co-Chair of Stark & Stark’s Divorce Group in the Lawrenceville, New Jersey office. For questions, please contact Mr. Eory.

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Failure to File a Timely New Jersey Property Tax Appeal Will Result in Dismissal

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Compliance with New Jersey’s procedural law for the filing of a property tax appeal is critical. In fact, filing an untimely appeal (even if only a few days late) will lead to dismissal. The Tax Court recently affirmed this well-settled principle and reiterated that a tax appeal for the current year must be filed on or before April 1st, or 45 days from the date the bulk mailing of the notices of assessment are completed, whichever is later. See Romero v. North Plainfield Borough, Docket No. 012383-2011, New Jersey Tax Court, January 20, 2012. The only exception to this is where a municipal-wide revaluation or municipal-wide reassessment has been implemented. In those instances, the appeal deadline is May 1st.
 

In Romero, the property owner merely filed his property tax appeal three days after the April 1st deadline. The property owner filed a motion with the Board of Taxation to allow the late filing of the appeal. The Board granted the motion over the opposition of the municipality. Subsequently, the Board entered a judgment affirming the property tax assessment, without prejudice, and the property owner appealed to the Tax Court.
 

The court ruled that because the property tax appeal was not filed by the April 1st deadline, neither the Tax Board nor the Tax Court had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The court stated that “it is well-settled law of this state that taxpayers must strictly comply with the statutory time limitations for filing an appeal, and that failure to do so is a fatal jurisdictional defect.”
 

The case demonstrates the importance of complying with filing deadlines and shows how strictly the courts follow New Jersey’s statutory framework in the context of tax appeals.

 

Marshall Kizner is an Associate in Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office concentrating in Property Tax Appeals. For questions, or additional information, please contact Mr. Kizner.

The Wonders of Mediation

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The right to a trial by jury is a fundamental liberty, residing at the heart of Anglo-American jurisprudence. It is a core value which defines us as a people and traces its roots prior to the Magna Carta in 1215. The Virginia Declaration of Rights adopted in 1776 provided that in a “suit between man and man, the ancient trial by jury is preferable to any other, and ought to be held sacred.”
 

As a method of resolving modern day civil disputes, however, trial by jury has lost some of its luster. The discovery process grinds slowly toward an often anticlimactic struggle between parties left traumatized by the process. Along the way, the “principle,” initially deemed worthy of vindication at all cost, can become elusive to the point of obscurity.
 

Parties put themselves at the mercy of the court, seeking money damages to restore them to a position formerly enjoyed. Their motivation may be primal: vengeance, pride or justice.  For some, the gamble pays handsomely. For others, “victory” rings hollow when compared with an alternative means of resolving the dispute.
 

In ancient societies, disputing parties sought a wise elder’s counsel; someone familiar with the parties and the dispute. A trusted broker, acting beyond reproach, this person served as a conduit through whom the parties could themselves reach a fair and just compromise.
 

The modern day equivalent of this time-honored practice, which predates even the revered trial by jury, is “mediation.” Mediation creates an atmosphere where posturing and gamesmanship, the life’s blood of litigation, is replaced by redirecting the parties’ creative energies to focus on a mutually beneficial solution. The virtues of mediation are its cost (a fraction of the cost of litigation), its non-binding informality (if it fails, the parties go back, without prejudice, to litigate in court), and its flexibility (offering infinite solutions, by contrast to the procedurally stilted remedies available in court).
 

Perhaps most important, it empowers parties to control their own destiny, rather than having an imperfect solution imposed by others, leaving both parties dissatisfied. It’s sometimes possible, through mediation, for both sides to prevail, each achieving a greater measure of “justice” than they might have otherwise. Novelist William Gaddis commented on the absurdity of the modern American legal system by beginning his book “A Frolic of His Own” with the following line: “Justice? – You get justice in the next world, in this world you have the law.”
 

Having practiced law for almost 30 years, I have seen cases where a jury trial was the only appropriate means to decide either a case of significant import to society or where circumstances simply precluded a pre-trial settlement. I have also seen tremendous good come of carefully orchestrated settlements in cases, both simple and highly complex.
 

The New Jersey Supreme Court has, since 1992, directed all lawyers to “become familiar with available (dispute resolution) programs and inform their clients of them.” After 20 years, it’s now firmly entrenched in the legal system, mostly because lawyers, clients and judges see it actually works.
 

Mohandas K. Gandhi, who practiced law, wrote: “I understood that the true function of a lawyer was to unite parties riven asunder. The lesson was so indelibly burnt into me that a large part of my time during the 20 years of my practice was occupied in bringing about compromises of hundreds of cases. I lost nothing thereby – not even money, certainly not my soul.”
 

A path trodden long ago has been rediscovered among the bramble of our system of dispensing modern American justice. Many who go down that path emerge more intact, their dignity better preserved, able to move forward, beyond “the case.” I hope that we who work within the civil justice system may continue to see its imperceptible shift toward a more enlightened awareness of the toll it exacts from its participants. We best serve our clients by empowering them, by allowing them the opportunity to help fashion the outcome of their legal disputes.
 

Having served as a mediator in approximately 100 cases, I am available to assist interested parties and their counsel in exploring alternate dispute resolution options, including mediation. 

 

Tom Pryor a Shareholder in Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office concentrating in Alternative Dispute Resolution. For questions, or additional information, please contact Mr. Pryor.

New Jersey Governor Vetoes Marriage Equality Bill Passed by State Legislature

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On February 16, 2012, New Jersey became the third state in American history to pass a marriage equality bill that would recognize same-sex marriage. However, in the shadows of the celebration in the state and national GLBT communities, stands the February 17th veto of Governor Chris Christie.

 

“[The Feb. 16] milestone came in the face of the toughest obstacles in the history of the marriage equality movement. Instead of a Governor twisting arms on our behalf, we have a Governor who twisted arms against us right up until the final votes in each chamber [of the legislature],” Garden State Equality Chair and CEO Steven Goldstein said in a statement before the Governor’s veto. Christie would prefer a state-wide referendum and let the voters of New Jersey decide the case.

 

The Governor’s veto has implications for universal marriage equality and may set a precedent for other states where similar marriage equality bills are on the ballot. While the legislature has until the end of the current term in Jan. 2014 to over ride the Governor’s veto, New Jersey still honors civil unions for same-sex couples and recognizes those from other jurisdictions.

 

Civil Unions in New Jersey provide GLBT couples with the same benefits and rights as “married” couples within the state.  However, there continue to be significant differences outside of the State of New Jersey and on a Federal level.  GLBT couples should seek legal advice to ensure they are fully protected and to discuss the rights and benefits that accrue to them as in the State of New Jersey under a Civil Union. 

 

Megan Smith is a member of Stark & Stark's Divorce Group in the firm's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office. For questions, or additional information, please contact Ms. Smith.

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The Termination of a Shareholder/Employee Without Cause Could Constitute Minority Oppression

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As I stated in my previous posts, in New Jersey, the seminal case as to what constitutes minority oppression is Brenner v. Berkowitz, 134 N.J. 488 (1993). In that case, the NJ Supreme Court applied the “reasonable expectations of a shareholder” test to determine what constitutes minority oppression. 

 

The termination of an employee could constitute minority oppression. A North Dakota case applying the same test used by New Jersey Courts, namely, “reasonable expectation of a shareholder” test found that a shareholder/employee should not be terminated without cause. The Court in Pedro v. Pedro, 489 N.W.2d 798, 802 (App. North Dakota. 1992) reasoned “in addition to an ownership interest, the reasonable expectation of such a shareholder are a job, salary, a significant place in management and economic security for his family.” The Pedro Court went on to hold, “in a closely held corporation the nature of the employment may create a reasonable expectation by the employee-owner that his employment is not terminable at will.” Id. at 802.

 

In other words, if a shareholder has the reasonable expectation to enjoy a job, that shareholder should not be terminated without cause.

 

Scott Unger is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office concentrating in Shareholder & Partner Dispute Litigation. For questions, or additional information, please contact Mr. Unger.

Stark & Stark Shareholder Receives New Jersey Builders Association's Chairman's Awards

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Gary S. Forshner, Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Real Estate, Zoning & Land Use Group, will be honored at the 2012 New Jersey Builder’s Association’s (NJBA) 63rd Annual Atlantic Builders Convention.

 

Mr. Forshner will receive the Chairman’s Award for his exemplary service on the Resolution & By-Laws Committee, and will also receive the Chairman’s Award for his exemplary service on the Builders Political Action Committee (BPAC). 

 

The Chairman’s Award recipient is chosen by each State Committee Chair and is given to a committee member who has made significant contributions to their respective committee over the past year. The NJBA recognizes each recipient’s assistance by presenting them with an award at the Annual Board of Directors meeting which will be held during this year’s Convention.

When Doctrines Collide: The competing doctrines of subrogation and entire controversy

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In the context of insurance, “subrogation” is when an insurance company files a claim to recover from a party causing a loss, after the insurance company has paid the policyholder for the covered loss.  The insurance company steps into the shoes of the insured policyholder and gets the benefit of whatever rights the policyholder may have had against the third-party causing the covered loss. For example, a fire loss occurs, resulting in a payment by the homeowners’ insurance company. After payment, the insurance company brings an action against the party deemed responsible for causing the fire.
 

Some insurance companies bring the subrogation action in the name of the insurance company, identifying in the filed pleading that the insurance company is asserting the claim as the subrogee of the insured, policyholder. This is the more straightforward way of proceeding and best alerts the parties involved to the “real party in interest.”
 

However, under certain circumstances, some insurance companies choose to bring the action in the name of the insured policyholder, thus creating confusion regarding the nature of the claim and the identity of the “real party in interest.” While this ordinarily may not present a problem, there are circumstances under which it can.
 

For example, assume the following facts: the policyholder is a common interest condominium or homeowners association and a covered loss occurs involving the roof on the association’s high-rise condominium building.  The first party insurance company pays out $100,000 to the Association to repair the roof after a windstorm.  The insurance company then files a subrogation action against the roofer and original developer for bad workmanship contributing to the loss, arising from the windstorm.
 

Assume the Association has other claims against the developer or roofer, unrelated to the storm related roof repair. If the insurance company files the subrogation action in the name of the Association, rather than in its own name, as subrogee, the Association may not even be aware of the filing of the lawsuit.  If the lawsuit continues and is ultimately resolved, resulting in a release to the roofer and developer, questions arise regarding whether this release, given in the name of the Association, can serve as an impediment to claims later brought by the Association in its own name, and as the real party in interest. 
 

While most courts can be relied upon to examine the situation on its facts and make a fair ruling that the equities would not bar a subsequent action by the Association, it is best if the Association is aware of the ongoing action, and can make its presence known to the court, securing necessary protections to toll any statute of limitations or guard against any waiver as result of the entire controversy doctrine.  This doctrine requires parties to assert, in one action, all known claims, to avoid multiple litigation filed regarding the same factual circumstances.

 

Parties receiving a settlement from their insurance carrier are advised to notify the insurance carrier in writing, upon payment, demanding notice of any future subrogation action.  This is intended to preserve the insured’s rights.  This way, the insured has the option of moving to intervene in the subrogation action.  Ideally, the insurance company, by providing notice of its intent to file a subrogation action, before actually filing the complaint, can negotiate with the insured’s general counsel regarding how best to protect both the rights of the insurance carrier and its insured.  For example, tolling agreements can be entered into, with consent, preserving future claims.  An important goal is to identify and protect the insured’s rights to monetary damages above and beyond the proceeds received through payment under its insurance policy. 
 

Questions arise where the damages suffered by the policyholder go beyond the amount paid by the insurance carrier to the policyholder.  Most courts hold that the insured, policyholder, should control the claim, where the policyholder’s actual loss exceeds the amount paid by the subrogee, insurance carrier.
 

Many of these issues are determined by the policy language, any agreements entered into between the policyholder in the insurance company surrounding a loss and subsequent payment under the policy, and by applicable case law.
 

Of course, every case is distinguishable by its facts and no conclusions should be drawn from this brief article.  The reader is cautioned to consult with an attorney under any circumstances which may involve the issues discussed above.  This article is not intended to be relied upon for any purpose, but is merely illustrative of certain problems that may arise where the interests of the doctrine of subrogation and entire controversy, may be in conflict.
 

Stark & Stark can provide valuable assistance in these situations, counseling the policyholder and taking necessary measures to ensure that the policyholder’s rights are fully preserved and protected.  
 

Thomas Pryor is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office concentrating his practice in Insurance Coverage & Liability issues. For questions, or additional information, please contact Mr. Pryor: tpryor@stark-stark.com.

What Standard is Applied in Granting a Grandparent's or Sibling's Request for Visitation?

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In a recent case, a mother’s parental rights were terminated over her 5 year old twins. An older sister (age 24) requested visitation from the foster mother who opposed it. The Trial Court and Appellate Court used a “best interests” of the child standard in determining the issue. In other words, they determined whether granting visitation to the older sibling was in the best interests of the child.
 

When this issue was brought to the Supreme Court (In the Matter of D.C. v. D.C., Minors), the standard was raised. It was determined that a sibling seeking visitation must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that denial of the visitation he/she seeks would result in harm to the child. This is the same standard now used for a grandparent seeking visitation.
 

The reason the standard had been raised was because it was determined that a parent, or a “psychological parent” (i.e., foster parent or other person who has assumed a parental role) has the fundamental right to autonomy in child rearing decisions. 
 

However, in an even more recent case (Tortorice v. Vanartsdalen - decided September 30, 2011), the Court has made a distinction between a natural parent and a psychological parent.  In a case between a natural parent (which includes a parent who has adopted a child) and a third party who is seeking visitation, the presumption of parental autonomy exists in favor of the natural parent.  But, if there is a dispute between a “psychological parent” and a third party, who wants visitation under the grandparent/sibling statute, then the Court must determine what is in the best interests of the child.

 

Maria Imbalzano is the Co-Chair of Stark & Stark’s Divorce Group in the Lawrenceville, New Jersey office. For questions, please contact Ms. Imbalzano: mimbalzano@stark-stark.com.

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Do you Have a Duty to Preserve Evidence?

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I can’t help but abuse legalese in my everyday life. Last night was no exception, when I accused my Wife of “spoliating” my good mood by watching “Glee.” Although I may have convinced my Wife to the contrary, the term “spoliation,” has nothing to do with whiny 30 year-old “high school students” incomprehensibly breaking into song. In fact, spoliation occurs when evidence that is pertinent to a lawsuit is destroyed, which interferes with the Court’s proper administration and disposition of the action. Aetna Life and Cas. Co. v. Imet Mason Contractors, 309 N.J.Super. 358, 364 (App.Div.1998) (quoting Hirsch v. General Motors Corp., 266 N.J.Super. 222, 234 (Law Div.1993)).
 

In general, a party has a duty to preserve evidence when there is:

  1. pending or probable litigation;
  2. knowledge by the party of the existence or likelihood of litigation;
  3. foreseeability of harm to the other party, or in other words, discarding the evidence would be prejudicial; and
  4. the evidence is relevant to the litigation. Aetna, supra, 309 N.J. Super. at 366-67

 

The party who destroys such evidence, commonly referred to as the “spoliator,” can be held liable regardless of whether he or she intentionally or merely negligently destroyed the evidence. Various civil remedies are available to rectify the spoliation. One such remedy is that the Court infers that the evidence the spoliator destroyed would have been unfavorable to him or her, as if it were a fact established at trial. A second remedy is a discovery sanction in which the Court designates that certain facts be taken as established, or refuses to permit the spoliator to support or oppose designated claims or defenses. Finally, Courts may prohibit the introduction of designated matters into evidence, dismiss an action, enter judgment by default, or may order the delinquent party to pay reasonable expenses resulting from his or her conduct, including attorney's fees.
 

In addition to the above remedies, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that if spoliation of evidence is discovered during the course of litigation, the offended party can receive an adverse inference jury charge in its case in chief and still assert a completely separate cause of action for fraudulent concealment of evidence. Tartaglia v. UBS PaineWebber, Inc., et al., 197 N.J. 81 (2008)
 

Even if the prospect of litigation is questionable, best practices therefore require parties, and especially those regularly conducting business, to preserve all evidence such as letters, emails, pictures, video recordings and audio recordings that might be relevant to a dispute. But go ahead and delete that Glee episode from your DVR.

 

Cary Kvitka is a member of Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey Litigation Group. For questions, or additional information, please contact Mr. Kvitka: ckvitka@stark-stark.com.

Can You Retire If You Have An Alimony Obligation?

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One of the most common divorce myths involves the assumption that permanent alimony, which is typically awarded in divorces where the parties have been married for many years, will continue indefinitely.  In New Jersey, it is well settled law that an alimony obligation is modifiable based upon a showing that a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the time that a divorce was entered.  Examples of a “change in circumstances” that may warrant a modification of an alimony obligation include an increase or decrease in either party’s income, cohabitation of the alimony recipient tantamount to remarriage,  receipt of an inheritance, loss of employment (if it is not voluntary), and good faith retirement.
 

The termination of an obligor’s alimony obligation occasioned upon the payor’s retirement is not automatic.  It is up to the obligor to file an application with the Court for a modification or termination of their alimony obligation.  In determining whether an obligor’s impending retirement constitutes a substantial change in circumstances warranting a modification or termination, the Court must consider: (1) the age and health of the party seeking to retire and (2) the motive and timing of the impending retirement.  The Court will also look to the obligor’s ability to pay alimony after retirement, and the dependent spouse’s ability to provide for themselves, which involves an examination of both parties’ incomes and assets.  In the event the Court determines that the reason for the obligor’s retirement is to avoid his or her alimony obligation, the application will be denied.    


Even if the Court determines that the payor has advanced a good faith reason for retirement, the Court must then decide whether the advantage of the retirement to the retiring spouse outweighs the disadvantage to the other party.  This determination is critical to the analysis.  If this inquiry is answered in the affirmative, only then will the Court address whether and to what extent the payor’s alimony obligation should be modified. 


In the event that the Court determines that the advantage to the payor in retiring does not “substantially outweigh” the disadvantage to the participant, then the payor’s retirement–even if pursued in good faith–will not be a basis to modify their alimony obligation.  This is a fact sensitive inquiry that the Court determines on a case-by-case basis. 


Of course, divorcing parties have the ability to negotiate through counsel an automatic date for the termination of alimony, if both parties agree.  If an agreement is reached that contemplates an automatic termination of alimony upon a triggering event (reaching a certain age, retirement, etc.), courts will enforce that agreement.  In negotiating these provisions, it is important that the payor of alimony understand that this is a benefit they would not normally receive and must be willing to offer something in exchange for an automatic termination.   


If you are contemplating a divorce, or are divorced, have an alimony obligation and are considering retirement, it is important to consult with an experienced family law attorney to determine how to best proceed.  
 

Corrine Cooke is a member of Stark & Stark's Divorce Group in our Lawrenceville, New Jersey office. For questions, or additional information, please contact Ms. Cooke: ccooke@stark-stark.com.

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The Applicability of Minority Oppression Claims to Limited Liability Companies

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On January 17, 2012, the New Jersey Appellate Division released its decision in the case, Hopkins, et. al. v. Duckett, et. al. The Hopkins decision further clarifies some of my earlier blog posts relating to choice of law issues in minority oppression litigation and the applicability of minority oppression claims to limited liability companies.

Choice of Law
Plaintiff Hopkins was a former New Jersey resident who moved to Indiana shortly before he commenced litigation in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Bergen County. Nightingale & Associates, LLC, the company at the center of Mr. Hopkins’ lawsuit, was a Delaware LLC with a principal place of business in Connecticut. The LLC’s operating agreement set forth the members’ agreement which states that all disputes were governed by Delaware law.
 

The Appellate Division found that Delaware law should govern the dispute because unlike the decisions which were the subject of my previous blog posts there were no substantial relationships to New Jersey. Moreover, there was no fundamental policy which required the application of New Jersey law. In other words, unlike Krzastek v. Global Resource Industrial and Power, Inc., No. A-1815-06T2 (App. Div. Sept. 11, 2008) and Conway v. DialAmerica Marketing, Inc., BER-C-116-08 (Super. Ct. Sept. 30, 2008), Nightingale & Associates, LLC did not maintain full time offices in New Jersey. Moreover, Nightingale & Associates, LLC did not employ many New Jersey residents.
 

Finally, only one owner of Nightingale & Associates, LLC had ties to New Jersey (although, he moved to Indiana prior to the commencement of his litigation). In addition, the entities in the Krzastek and Conway cases were corporations. The entity in the Hopkins case was a limited liability company where the parties entered into an operating agreement and agreed that Delaware law should apply. Those reasons led to the use of Delaware law in the Hopkins case.
 

Application of the Minority Oppression Statute to an LLC
In an article I published in the New Jersey Law Journal, I asserted that the minority oppression statute may not apply to limited liability companies. In that article, I asserted that the minority oppression statute should protect minority members of a Limited Liability Company. I asserted that the New Jersey Legislature should modify the statute to afford the same protections offered to minority members of a Limited Liability Company. The Appellate Division in Hopkins reaffirmed that the New Jersey minority oppression statute does not apply to limited liability companies. See also, Denike v. Cupo, 394 N.J. Super. 357, 378 (App. Div. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 196 N.J. Super. 502 (2008).  Until the New Jersey Legislature amends the statute to afford minority members the same protections offered to shareholders in a corporation, I strongly encourage minority members to insist that the operating agreement afford them the protections found in N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(c).

 

Scott Unger is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office concentrating in Shareholder & Partner Dispute Litigation. For questions, or additional information, please contact Mr. Unger.

A Decrease in Salary, Standing Alone, Does Not Warrant a Reduction in Alimony

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In a recent New Jersey divorce case (Bonaventuro v. Bonaventuro), the Court refused to lower the ex-Husband’s alimony obligation, even though he had been laid off from his job. The facts are as follows: The ex-Husband was laid off from his position with a consulting company which involved projects for banks and broker dealers. He had earned approximately $150,000 per year.  Pursuant to a prior Court Order, he was paying monthly alimony in the amount of $2,850. The ex-Wife had worked part time as a clerk at a bank; however, her position had also been recently eliminated. 
 

In September 2010, the ex-Husband filed a motion to suspend his alimony obligation until he obtained full time employment. He also requested that the accrual of arrears be stayed (or stopped) during that time. His only source of income was unemployment compensation of $390 a week. He asserted that he applied for 181 different jobs and established a professional profile on a networking site. 
 

The Trial Court denied the ex-Husband’s motion, and he appealed. The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court’s decision denying the ex-Husband relief. Both courts stated that the person seeking modification has the burden of showing changed circumstances that would warrant relief. In this case, there was a substantial decrease in the ex-Husband’s salary; however, the Court stated that a decrease, standing alone, will not constitute the requisite showing of changed circumstances. 
 

The Court noted the following:

  1. the ex-Husband did not seek training or employment in related fields
  2. he failed to establish that he had exhausted all of his assets, including his retirement fund
  3. he failed to adequately explain and provide proofs of his severance pay
  4. he failed to adequately account for monies and assets that he received upon the divorce, including the recent sale of his home

Maria Imbalzano is the Co-Chair of Stark & Stark’s Divorce Group in the Lawrenceville, New Jersey office. For questions, please contact Ms. Imbalzano: mimbalzano@stark-stark.com.

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What Happens if I Die Without a Will?

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If someone were to die without having a will in place, a common misconception that is often times mentioned is that the deceased’s assets are turned over to the State. This is completely false. Instead, state law determines who will receive the deceased’s property. Each state has a statute (the intestacy statute) that provides who the people are that are the closest relatives to the deceased, and those relative receive the deceased’s estate.
 

New Jersey law is as follows:

For a single person:

  1. To the person’s descendants
  2. If there are no descendants, to the person’s parents
  3. If there are no descendants or parents, to the descendants of the person’s parents
  4. If there are no descendants, parents, or descendants of parents, one-half to the paternal grandparents, or if they are also deceased, to their descendants; and the other one-half to the maternal grandparents, or their descendants
  5. If there are no descendants of grandparents, to stepchildren
  6.  

For a married person (spouse or domestic partner):

  1. The entire estate passes to the surviving spouse, if there are no descendants or parents of the deceased.
  2. If there are descendants, all of whom are also descendants of the surviving spouse, then the surviving spouse receives the entire estate.
  3. If the deceased is survived by a spouse and parent(s), the spouse receive the first 25% of the estate, but not less than $50,000 nor more than $200,000, plus 75% of the balance; the parent(s) receive the remaining property of the estate.
  4. If the surviving descendants are also descendants of the surviving spouse, and the surviving spouse has other descendants; or if there is a descendant of the deceased who is not a descendant of the surviving spouse, then the spouse receives the first 25% of the estate, but not less than $50,000 nor more than $200,000, plus 50% of the balance.  The descendants receive the remaining property of the estate.

Now, maybe these are the people who you would want to inherit from you. But maybe they are not. Preparing and signing a Will gives you the power of choice to benefit others - family, friends, and/or charity - rather than relinquishing that choice to the government.
 

There is another important issue that state law will control if a person has died without a Will: guardianship of your minor children. If a child under the age of 18 has no living parent, state law determines that the child’s closest next of kin have the first right to serve as the child’s guardian. Being the closest relative does not really qualify someone to raise a child. And, if several persons are related in the same way to the child (for example, both sets of grandparents), the Court then decides, with both sides of the family incurring legal fees as well suffering an emotional hardship. Again, it is a matter of choice - should you choose who should raise your child in the event of an untimely death, or should the government?
 

Preparing a Will is not something you do for you - it is something you do for your family. To ensure your loved ones are benefitted, that your children are properly cared for, and that your estate is administered at the least possible cost, please contact us as to how we can assist you in preparing a Will and other estate planning documents.

 

Rose Durkin is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark's Lawrenceville, New Jersey office specializing in Wills & Estate Planning. For questions, please contact Ms. Durkin.

Bankruptcy 101 for Lenders: Key Points to Consider in a Chapter 7 Filing

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With the advent of the bankruptcy law changes in 2005, individuals have fewer alternatives when considering bankruptcy. An individual facing bankruptcy has three options to consider filing under, those being Chapter 7, Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 of the code. For a lender, the consumer’s choice of chapter has unique implications to be considered, and the devices and methods available to the lender under Chapter 7 will be considered in this article. The lender’s options for protective actions in Chapters 11 and 13 will be discussed in later articles.

 

Since Chapter 11 is typically used by small businesses we’ll start off by comparing Chapter 7 and 13 proceedings. The key difference between Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 is the repayment of debt. Chapter 7 is bankruptcy liquidation, meaning your assets are liquidated to pay lenders, with certain exceptions. Chapter 13 allows consumers with a regular income to establish a payment plan to pay back all or some of their debts to creditors, over a period of time.

 

To qualify for a Chapter 7 bankruptcy a consumer must obtain mandatory credit counseling within 180 days before filing bankruptcy, meet the means test and then file a petition and related schedules with the bankruptcy court. Upon filing, the automatic stay is put in place, which limits the actions of creditors and other pending legal actions. The court will appoint a Trustee to oversee the case. In a Chapter 7 a consumer’s assets (valued as of the date of the filing), with certain exceptions, will be liquidated and the proceeds will be used to pay creditors. At the termination of the matter the consumer will receive a discharge.

 

In this Chapter, a consumer’s home may be saved only if payments are kept current. Therefore, a lender should closely monitor the payments. If they are not made, the lender should refer the account to Bankruptcy Counsel who can then apply for relief from the automatic stay.

 

As a less costly alternative the lender can wait until the trustee has abandoned his interest and the debtor has been discharged in Bankruptcy and then start the foreclosure process (this is not recommended since the foreclosure process may take several months and the sooner one starts the process the more likely that a greater recovery will be achieved). Time almost never favors the lender in the current market and in the foreclosure process.

 

In this Chapter a loan secured by a vehicle must be kept current. A lender should closely monitor the payments and insurance for the collateral. If they are not timely made nor kept in place the lender should refer this to Bankruptcy Counsel who can then apply for relief from the automatic stay. The lender can also wait until the trustee has abandoned his interest and the debtor has been discharged in Bankruptcy and then start the repossession/replevin process but this is not recommended. This collateral is subject to vast depreciation and loss.

 

The consumer has one of four options:

  1. He can keep the payments current
  2. Redeem the vehicle for its value (usually NADA wholesale or its equivalent)
  3. surrender the vehicle, or
  4. reaffirm the debt

While reaffirmation achieves the ultimate protection for a creditor, the amendments to the bankruptcy code have made this path so arduous that it is seldom achieved and the time and energy spent make this an impractical choice in most instances. If reaffirmed and approved by the Court, the consumer is bound by the original contract and may be sued for a deficiency if he were to default.

 

Bari Gambacorta is a Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Bankruptcy & Creditors' Rights Group in the Lawrenceville, New Jersey office. For questions, please contact Mr. Gambacorta.