Stark & Stark Shareholder to Present Seminar to the Society of Financial Service Professionals

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Paul A. Lieberman, Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Securities Group, will present a seminar in conjunction with the Monmouth/Ocean County Chapter of the Society of Financial Service Professionals. The seminar will take place at the SFSP’s 2011 Kickoff Breakfast Meeting, Wednesday January 12, 2011 at The Lincroft Inn, Lincroft, New Jersey.

 

The seminar will discuss the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act (consumer protection act) and the passage of the Bush tax cuts and their effect on your business and clients. For questions, additional information, or to register for the event, please contact Rich Campbell at 732-530-7588 by January 5, 2011.

Update on YAZ® Case Management Conference

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On December 16, 2010, counsel attended a Case Management Conference before Judge Martinotti in Bergen County Superior Court in Hackensack, New Jersey. It was agreed that counsel will continue to work together to depose, or question, the necessary witnesses from defendant Bayer Corporation, both domestically and internationally.  Additionally, plaintiffs were granted authority to file a motion with the Court, seeking to compel the production of foreign personnel files from employees noticed for deposition, which the defendants argue is prohibited under German law.  The motion is expected to be heard in early 2011. 

The next Case Management Conference is currently scheduled for February 3, 2011.  At that time, counsel is hopeful that we can construct a time-line to identify the bellwether cases, as already done in the Federal MDL, and move toward scheduling trial dates.

If you feel you have experienced any side-effects from taking YAZ® or Yasmin® (or the generic brand, Ocella®), you can contact Stark & Stark and speak to one of the Mass Tort/Pharmaceutical Litigation attorneys, free of charge, who can help assess any claims that you might have against the YAZ®, Yasmin® or Ocella® manufacturers.

New Supreme Court Case Requires Hearing to Determine if Evidence of Discrimination was Hidden From Plaintiff Regarding Claims That Are Otherwise Barred By The Two Year Statute of Limitations

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In an unusual decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court in Henry v. New Jersey Department of Human Services (A-69 September Term) added a new wrinkle in the state’s anti-discrimination law that will not sit well with employers.
 

The decision gives employee plaintiffs another way around the 2-year limitations period applicable to state discrimination cases. In the Henry case, the Plaintiff alleged that the truth had been withheld from her when she had been unfairly bypassed for promotion by Caucasian co-applicants. The Court found that Plaintiff was allegedly mislead regarding the reasons for her “reclassification,” and that – if she had known the truth -  she would have known of (“discovered”) that she had an actionable discrimination claim. Since the employer had allegedly hidden these facts from her, her claims of discrimination should not be barred by the statute of limitations.
 

In future cases where the date of “discovery” of a claim is at issue, a “Lopez” hearing will be held to determine when/if a plaintiff could have/should have known of the alleged discriminatory action.
 

This case, although it is intended to have limited application, is not good news for employers because it expands the “discovery” rule that can “toll” the two-year New Jersey Law Against Discrimination. This case may have the unfortunate side effect of producing a rash of demands by plaintiffs for Lopez hearings regarding what discrimination they “could have” known about during their employment. 

Stark & Stark Attorneys Offer Guidance on SEC's Changes to the Form ADV

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Thomas D. Giachetti, Chair, and Stephen A. Galletto, members of Stark & Stark’s Securities Group, were quoted in the December 20, 2010 AdvisorOne.com article, SEC’s New Form ADV Requirements: Fidelity Offers Guidance.

 

The article discusses the Securities & Exchange Commission’s recent revisions to the Form ADV and the steps registered investment advisors are taking in order to comply with the latest round of changes. The article discusses Fidelity’s efforts to assist their clients with the changes through webinars and regional workshops. Mr. Galletto states, “states are now converting over to the Part 2 A form, and no state is rejecting the format.” Mr. Galletto, and Mr. Giachetti are assisting Fidelity with its webinars and workshops series.

 

You can read the full article online here.
 

Minority Oppression: Course of Dealing to Establish the Reasonable Expectations of the Shareholders

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When meeting a new client, I  am often asked what constitutes minority oppression?  That is a difficult question to answer because there is not a “one size fit all” definition of what constitutes minority oppression.  As described in previous blog posts, New Jersey law focuses on the “reasonable expectations of the shareholder.”  When representing oppressed minority shareholders, I focus on at least three important issues.  They are:

  1. what are the reasonable expectations as a shareholder?
  2. what is the basis of those expectations; and
  3. how were those expectations breached?


One thing I focus on when considering those three important questions is the course of dealing between the shareholders. The course of dealing can be extremely important in establishing the shareholder’s reasonable expectations. For example, in one of my minority oppression cases, my client received company financial records for more than ten years.  After that ten plus year period, the majority unilaterally decided to prevent the minority shareholder from reviewing the closely held company’s books and records. The course of allowing my client to review the books and records for the ten plus year period could be used to establish that my client had the reasonable expectation to receive and review the company’s books and records. 

Lawsuits Filed In Response to DePuy Orthopedic, Inc. Hip Recall

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As we have previously reported, DePuy Orthopedic, Inc., a subdivision of Johnson & Johnson, Inc., finally issued a recall in August 2010 for the ASR XL Acetabular System and the ASR Hip Resurfacing System after data suggested that about one out of every eight may fail within only five years. Specifically, the recall targeted individuals who received the implants after July 2003. It has been suggested that a design flaw increases risk complications, such as:

 

  • Unexplained Hip Pain
  • Thigh Pain or Groin Pain
  • Pain with Walking
  • Pain Rising from a Seated Position
  • Pain with Weight Bearing
  • Swelling around the Hip
  • Memory Loss
  • Hand Tremors
  • Tinnitus
  • Hearing Loss
  • Diminished Coordination


Since the recall in August 2010, a number of lawsuits have been filed in both the federal and state court levels.  The number of lawsuits filed is expected to increase dramatically as more people learn of the recall.

On December 3, 2010, the United States Panel on Multi-District Litigation issued an Order, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1407, consolidating all federal DePuy hip replacement recall lawsuits and centralizing them in an MDL (Multidistrict Litigation) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio.  The Panel concluded that, “the actions share factual issues as to whether DePuy’s ASR XL Acetabular Hip System, a device used in hip replacement surgery, was defectively designed and/or manufactured, and whether DePuy failed to provide adequate warnings concerning the device, which DePuy recalled along with another ASR device, the ASR Hip Resurfacing System, in August 2010.”  The Panel opined that the centralization in the Northern District of Ohio will serve the convenience of the parties and witnesses and promote the just and efficient conduct of the litigation.  Furthermore, the centralization will eliminate duplicative discovery, prevent inconsistent pretrial rulings on discovery and other issues, and conserve the resources of the parties, their counsel and the judiciary. Judge David A. Katz, an experienced transferee judge, will coordinate discovery and pretrial proceedings.

Essentially, the Panel’s ruling means that all lawsuits over recalled DePuy ASR hip replacement systems that are filed in any federal district court throughout the United States will be transferred to U.S. District Judge David A. Katz in Ohio.  However, cases filed in state court will continue in their respective states.

If you have had a hip implant within the past 7 years but are uncertain what type of implant device was used, you should contact your doctor immediately for additional information. 

If you have had a hip replacement, which used one of the recalled DePuy devices, you can contact Stark & Stark and speak to one of the Mass Tort attorneys, free of charge, who can help assess any claims that you might have against the DePuy manufacturers.

FINRA To Ease Arbitrator Standards In Bonus Cases

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Thomas B. Lewis, Chair of Stark & Stark’s Employment Group, was quoted in the December 21, 2010 Financial Advisor Magazine article, FINRA To Ease Arbitrator Standards In Bonus Cases. As the number of cases involving brokers’ signing bonuses continues to increase, FINRA is seeking to reduce the requirements for who can serve on arbitration panels hearing the cases. Since the increase began in 2008 the number of claims filed over unreturned bonuses has more than doubled and now FINRA is having a tough time finding enough arbitratiors to fill the hearing panels.

 

And it doesn’t look like the number of claims will be settled any time soon. Mr. Lewis states, “There is a common misconception among advisors that brokerages will negotiate the balance, and that is contributing to the increase in the number of cases. There's a notion among brokers that firms will take fifty-cents on the dollar, but firms want a hundred percent.”

 

You can read the full article online here.
 

NJ Housing & Mortgage Finance Agency Offers Loan Monies for Energy Efficient Upgrades

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As a result of funding made available to New Jersey through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the NJ Housing & Mortgage Finance Agency (NJHMFA) has introduced a number of loan programs to facilitate the construction of energy efficiency upgrades and renewable energy installations in multifamily housing.  One such program is the Multifamily Energy Efficiency Improvement Pilot (MEEIP), which provides loans for eligible energy efficiency upgrades at an interest rate of two percent (2%) to owners of certain multifamily structures.  Financing is limited to a maximum of $2,000 per unit and $500,000 per project.  An applicant who seeks funding under this program must own a multifamily building that is over 20 years old and contains at least five units and must either have an existing primary permanent mortgage with the NJHMFA or propose to renovate the building into rental housing with a NJHMFA primary permanent mortgage.  In addition, to qualify an applicant must participate in the Board of Public Utilities’ Pay for Performance Program, agree to extend affordability controls for an additional 15 years and satisfy a host of other requirements.

Medicaid Planning: Dotting the"i"s and Crossing the "t"s

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That well-worn adage may seem trite and arcane, but strict adherence to technical requirements is critical in Medicaid planning.  Since federal and state budget deficits are now the rule, rather than the exception, it is not surprising to see Courts stretch to find technicalities that can be used to deny eligibility for Medicaid benefits.  A prime example occurred this past summer, when the Massachusetts Court of Appeals disqualified a widow for Medicaid benefits because of a technicality in a trust established by her deceased husband more than 25 years earlier.  First, let me provide some definitions.
 

The term “Testamentary Trust” refers to a Trust established by the terms of a decedent’s Last Will and Testament, indicating only that the Trust provisions are described within the pages of the decedent’s Last Will and Testament.
 

The term “Inter-Vivos Trust” refers to a Trust established during lifetime, indicating only that the Trust provisions are described in a separate Trust Agreement, not in the individual’s Last Will and Testament.
 

The term “Medicaid Qualifying Trust” refers to a Trust that disqualifies its beneficiary for Medicaid benefits, since the Trust is presumed to have been established solely for the purpose of qualifying for Medicaid benefits.  Under Massachusetts Law, Inter-Vivos Trusts are presumed to be Medicaid Qualifying Trusts, but Testamentary Trusts are not.
 

In Victor v Mass. Executive Office of Health & Human Services (Mass. Ct. App. No. 09-P-1361, July 21, 2010), Mr. Victor wanted to create a Trust for the benefit of his wife, to take effect upon his death if he predeceased her.  To accomplish that result, he could have created a Testamentary Trust in his Last Will and Testament, or he could have created an Inter-Vivos Trust, with the Trust provisions in a separate Trust Agreement.  In either case, the Trust provisions would have been identical and the Executor of Mr. Victor’s Estate would be directed to transfer the balance of Mr. Victor’s Estate to the Trustee of the Trust.  The sole difference would have been the piece of paper which Mr. Victor used to describe the Trust provisions.
 

If Mr. Victor had chosen to include the Trust provisions in his Last Will and Testament, creating a Testamentary Trust, the Trust would not be a Medicaid Qualifying Trust and Mrs. Victor would have been eligible for Medicaid benefits.  Unfortunately, when Mr. Victor created the Trust more than 25 years earlier, he chose to use an Inter-Vivos Trust instead, making it a Medicaid Qualifying Trust and, thereby, making Mrs. Victor ineligible for Medicaid benefits.
 

Logic and reason can, sometimes, overcome technical deficiencies, but not when it comes to Medicaid eligibility.  One cannot assume that an individual will receive Medicaid benefits because it seems to make sense, or it seems to be the fair outcome.  Fairness and logic cannot replace technical precision.
 

Mrs. Victor did nothing to warrant being ineligible for Medicaid benefits.  She violated no Medicaid regulations.  She did not even create the Trust - her deceased husband did.  The Trust provisions did not lead to the disqualification.  This case was decided solely on the fact that Mrs. Victor’s deceased husband chose to use an Inter-Vivos Trust, instead of a Testamentary Trust, more than 25 years earlier.

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Estate Tax Limbo: Here We Go Again!

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We’re just a few days away from witnessing something that was never supposed to be.  I have always cautioned client against expecting tax law to be logical.  In many areas of the law, the correct answer is the one that makes the most sense.  But tax law is driven by politics, not by common sense.
 

Even so, in more than 30 years of practicing law, I have never seen anything as absurd as what is happening now.  In 2001, a political compromise led to a temporary reduction in the federal estate tax.  Without the 2001 tax reduction, the amount exempt from federal estate taxation would have been $1,000,000.  The 2001 law temporarily increased that exemption through 2009, eliminated the estate tax for 2010 estates, and will reinstate the $1,000,000 exemption on January 1, 2011.
 

By its very nature, estate planning deals with uncertainty because so many life events will always be unpredictable.  How long will I live?  What health issues will I face?  What will my family look like?  What special needs will my beneficiaries have? Will anyone challenge my choices?  With all that uncertainty, having a stable, permanent, estate tax law helped keep the planning simpler, and therefore, less costly.  Since 2001, the task of developing estate plans that met our clients’ needs and objectives has been like trying to hit a moving target.  The estate tax uncertainty left us trying to plan around an infinite number of possibilities - a $1,000,000 exemption, an unlimited exemption, and anything in between.
 

Since 2001, most pundits have been certain that Congress would never let 2009 pass without amending this illogical tax law.  Even after Congress proved the pundits wrong, they remained convinced that Congress would act in 2010.  At the least, Congress was expected to allow 2010 estates to elect to use the 2009 law, since couples with a net worth of $7,000,000 or less fared better in 2009 than in 2010.  Still no action and only 2 weeks left in the year.
 

Sadly, Congress is not even discussing a permanent fix.  To the contrary, the only proposal currently being debated is whether to continue the uncertainty with another temporary fix - this one good for only 24 month.  Observing Congress’ 10-year failure to enact a permanent fix, the question is whether there is a political disincentive to do so.  The estate tax is a perfect wedge issue on both sides of the political aisle, giving rise to speculation that we will never have a rational and permanent solution.

Minority Oppression: The Business Judgment Rule May Not Shield The Oppressor

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The business judgment rule shields directors and officers of a corporation from liability if the decisions made by them were made in good faith, with due care and in the corporation’s best interests.  New Jersey Courts have clarified that the “business judgment rule” is not a defense in cases of oppression of a minority shareholder in a close corporation. “Simply put, judicial consideration of a claim of minority oppression or freeze out in a closely held corporation is guided by considerations broader than those espoused in the ‘business judgment rule.’” Maul v. Kirkman, 270 N.J. Super. 596, 614 (App. Div. 1994).  Hence, a majority shareholder will bear the burden of proving their decisions which negatively effect the minority shareholder or the corporation were made in good faith and in the honest belief that those decisions were in the company’s best interests.

New Jersey Legislature Adopts Law Requiring State Entities to Replace Fossil Fuels with Biofuels

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On October 25, 2010, the New Jersey State Assembly overwhelmingly passed by a vote of 77-0 its bill A1052, which amends Title 52 of the Revised Statutes to require State entities generally to “consider the use of biofuels to replace the use of petroleum-based fossil fuels” and specifically to make such purchases “for heating equipment, or other similar combustion systems, motor vehicles, or other motorized equipment[]” provided that the State entity determines that (1) the cost of using biofuels is either the same or less than the cost of using fossil fuels and (2) the use of biofuels for the purpose in question is reasonable, prudent and cost effective.

According to the Legislative declaration, “[i]t is in the public interest for the State to advance biofuel technologies by adopting policies that foster the production and purchase of biofuels as means to promote alternative energy technologies, reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and reduce reliance on petroleum-based fossil fuels.”  The term “biofuel” is defined under the bill as “liquid or gaseous fuels produced from organic sources such as sustainably grown and harvested crops including native noninvasive energy crops, agricultural residues and non-recycled organic waste including waste cooking oil, grease and food wastes.  The term “energy crops” is also separately defined under the legislatively approved bill a complete copy of which may be found on the New Jersey Legislature’s website.

The ultimate disposition of Assembly bill 1052 is uncertain.  Prior to the Assembly vote the Senate also passed the bill (substituting A1052 for its bill S1413) by a significant margin (37-0).  The legislation now goes to Governor Christie.

Residential Evictions - More Hurdles For Landlords To Overcome to Evict The Non and Late Paying Tenant

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Recently in Matthew G. Carter Apartments v. Richardson, A-1992-09T3 (November 24, 2010) the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division, considered an appeal concerning the issue of habitual lateness under New Jersey’s Anti-Eviction Act N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 et seq. (the “Act”).   The relevant section of the act considered by the Court is 2A:18-61.1(j), which permits a landlord to evict a tenant, who “after written notice to cease, has habitually and without legal justification failed to pay rent which is due and owing.”  Stated more simply, a landlord can evict a tenant for habitual lateness where he or she makes more than one (1) late payment following such written notice.  See A.P. Dev. Corp. v. Band, 113 N.J. 485 (1988).         
 

In reviewing 2A:18-61.1(j), the Appellate Division determined that a strict mechanical definition of “habitual lateness” under  2A:18-61.1(j) in every case would run counter to the intent of the Act.  Instead, the Court established a rule holding that “each case requires a fact sensitive inquiry into the tenant’s conduct after receipt of the notice to cease” and “the trial judge must assess the evidence as to the time and circumstances of the late payments to determine whether a cause of action for eviction has been proven.”  Notably, the Court did not foreclose the possibility that evictions based on habitual lateness could still be filed in a period as short as two (2) months.  However, given the tone of the Court’s opinion, Landlords who bring such actions are likely to face increased scrutiny and skepticism from the Court and would be wise not to rush to Court as soon as the second late payment following written notice is made.

Minority Oppression: Shareholders' Agreement Do Not Govern If Minority Oppression

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Sometimes defendants who are sued for minority oppression will try to utilize a valuation formula contained in a shareholder’s agreement instead of “fair value.”  That is because shareholders’ agreements will  utilize a formula such as “book value” which more favorable to the oppressor than the statutory required valuation methodology–   “fair value.”

 

It is well settled in New Jersey that the formula or methodology set forth in a shareholder’s agreement does not apply to fixing the price of the minority shareholder’s stock interest where the sale being ordered because of minority oppression.  Hughes v. Sego Int’l. Ltd., 192 N.J. Super. 60, 69-70 (App. Div. 1983).  In Hughes, the Appellate Division revised a Trial Judge who utilized a formula contained in a shareholder’s agreement without first determining the “fair value” of the stock. Hughes, 192 N.J. Super. at 69-70; see, Hamilton, Johnson v. Johnson, 256 N.J. Super. 657, 672 (App. Div.), certif. den. 130 N.J. 595 (1992); see also, Torres v. Schripps, 342 N.J. Super. 419, 433-435 (App. Div. 2001). That is because N.J.S.A. 14A:12-7(8)(a) requires that the purchase price be “fair value” of the shares.  Hamilton, 256 N.J. Super. at 672.  Hence, if the Court finds minority oppression it will not apply the valuation formula contained in the shareholder’s agreement unless that formula resembles “fair value.”

Stark & Stark Shareholder Comments on First Command's Martin Durbin's Retirement

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Brian A. Carlis, Shareholder in Stark & Stark’s Securities Group, was quoted in the December 2, 2010 RIABiz.com article, First Command's Marty Durbin retires -- well after his scandalized IBD went RIA to rehab its image. The article discusses Martin Durbin’s recent retirement from First Command Financial Planning. Durbin is known for leading one of the more compelling conversions to the RIA model in the advisory world and some question if his departure would change the direction of the company, which is known for embracing the fiduciary standard.

 

Mr. Carlis states, “With an SEC-registered RIA firm, the disclosure regulations are substantial. But, there’s far more flexibility to sell different sorts of products in the RIA model, as long as disclosures are made.”

 

You can read the full article online here.

Billboards: Real or Personal Property When Taken by The Government

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On November 1, 2010, the New Jersey Supreme Court refused to review a decision by the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey holding that a billboard located along the New Jersey Turnpike was not “real property” under the Eminent Domain Act of 1971. New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Witt, et. al., Docket No. A-0995-09T3 (App. Div. July 15, 2010).

 

On June 26, 2009,  the New Jersey Turnpike Authority (“NJTA”) filed a complaint seeking to acquire property containing an office building and a double-sided billboard.  The billboard was owned by an outdoor advertising company who leased part of the property from the owner to construct the billboard.  The billboard company opposed the taking arguing that the billboard was real property and, as a result, the NJTA was required to enter into bona fide negotiations to purchase the billboard prior to filing suit.   The outdoor advertising company’s argument was based primarily upon N.J.S.A: 20:3-2-(d), which defines property as:
 

Land, or any interest in land, and (1) any building, structure or other improvement imbedded or affixed to land, and any article so affixed or attached to such building, structure or improvement as to be an essential and integral part thereof, (2) any article affixed or attached to such property in such manner that it cannot be removed without material injury to itself or to the property, (3) any article so designed, constructed, or specifically adapted to the purpose for which such property is used that (a) it is an essential accessory or part of such property; (b) it is not capable of use elsewhere; and (c) would lose substantially all its value if removed from such property.
 

The outdoor advertising company argued that its billboard, which stood 43 feet tall above the ground and was imbedded in the ground in a 20 x 20 x 5 foot slab of concrete, was an “improvement imbedded or affixed to the land” and thus compensable property.  The property owner and NJTA disagreed and argued that the billboard was personal property.
 

The Appellate Division reviewed the statutory definition of property and concluded that the key issue is not how the billboard is attached to the property, but whether it is an “essential and integral part of the land.”  In reviewing the facts before the court, the Appellate Division agreed with the property owner which argued that a billboard is not part and parcel to the property, “but merely a trade fixture owned by LaMar that is located on the property.”  The Court also found that the specific language in the lease stating that the “landlord agrees that the sign shall remain tenant’s personal property” clearly shows that the outdoor advertising company “never considered the billboard as real property and reserved its right to remove the billboard at anytime during the terms of the lease.”

 

Although billboard cases may not be as common as one would think, the decision clearly stresses the importance of evaluating all potential rights being acquired in a condemnation case.  The analysis must include an extensive review of the applicable statutes and case law, and a thorough understanding of real property law.